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# Letter dated 25 July 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I wish to refer to paragraph 24 of Security Council resolution 2297 (2016), requesting me to conduct a joint assessment mission of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), with the African Union (AU), after the 2016 electoral process, and to present recommendations to the Security Council to ensure that AMISOM is properly configured to support the next phase of State-building in Somalia under a new political dispensation.

On this basis, the United Nations and the African Union conducted a joint review mission between 10 and 29 May 2017. The mission, which was co-led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the Secretariat and the Peace and Security Department of the African Union Commission, included military, police, political, human rights and logistics experts from the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Field Support, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), AMISOM, the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU). Representatives of a number of Member States and of the European Union also participated in the review.

The joint review should be seen as one element of a comprehensive strategic planning process in Somalia that started in 2016, including the United Nations strategic assessment, which was completed in March 2017 (S/2017/404), the 10-year lessons learned review conference on AMISOM conducted on 9 and 10 March 2017 (see annex III), which informed the joint review, and the electoral needs assessment mission, which took place from 22 March to 4 April 2017 (see S/2017/408). The joint review builds, in particular, on the findings of the United Nations strategic assessment, during which considerations about the United Nations role with regard to security in Somalia were deliberately deferred to the joint review to ensure that they could be reflected upon in conjunction with the assessment of the future role and configuration of AMISOM.

The members of the joint review team held consultations with relevant national and international partners in Mogadishu and Addis Ababa. While in Mogadishu, the members organized a three-day workshop with senior security officials and experts from the Federal Government of Somalia and the interim Federal Member States to ensure adequate consultation and Somali ownership. The findings of the joint review were considered by the African Union Peace and Security Council on 12 July 2017 (see annex II) and were adopted by the Council at its 700th meeting in a communiqué (see annex I).



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**Developments since the last joint review and the adoption of resolution 2182 (2015)**

During the past two years, Somalia has made important strides on the political front. A federal State is emerging. In the security sector, significant progress has been achieved, in particular over the last months. The 16 April 2017 agreement on the main principles of a national security architecture revived hope for accelerating security sector reform and, with it, advancing the prospects for sustainable peace and security in Somalia. In the agreed-upon national security architecture the new federal policing model, agreed upon in May 2016, was confirmed. The new architecture and the new policing model constitute key building blocks in establishing effective and accountable governance structures in the security sector.

President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed Farmajo has established the National Security Council, which includes the Federal Government of Somalia and all Federal Member States. On 11 May 2017, at the London conference on Somalia, a new partnership agreement and a security pact were signed by Somalia and its international partners, including the African Union and the United Nations.

AMISOM continued to make a fundamental contribution to peace, security and stability in Somalia. Since its inception, AMISOM interventions have prevented Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups from taking over the country and have provided the space and the foundation for State-building and peacebuilding throughout Somalia. This has included important reconciliation and other political processes, resulting, inter alia, in the establishment of a federal map and interim administrations in five Federal Member States. AMISOM has also played a particularly important role in securing the 2016-2017 electoral process, bringing about a Federal Government that enjoys wide legitimacy throughout Somalia.

Where possible, AMISOM has also facilitated security for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, especially during the drought. The active presence of AMISOM has allowed for increased accessibility of a number of main supply routes, in spite of the challenges that continue to be encountered, and has provided communities in need with the option of avoiding long and hazardous travel by seeking aid in nearby areas controlled by AMISOM and the Government. However, I wish to stress that the humanitarian crisis remains dire, and the need for continued assistance is acute.

The police sector has seen considerable progress. The diligent efforts of AMISOM in supporting the Somali police through vetting, recruitment, training and mentoring assistance are showing impressive results in Mogadishu and in two Federal Member States. UNSOM continues to provide critical assistance for the implementation of the new policing model through policy advice on establishing institutional policing structures.

Notwithstanding these achievements, the 22,126 strong AMISOM uniformed personnel presence continues to be confronted with ever changing challenges, against the backdrop of a fragile political and security situation. Those challenges are compounded by the fact that AMISOM remains without sufficient critical enablers.

Continued funding for AMISOM troop reimbursements remains a critical challenge. I commend the European Union for its valuable contribution through its continuing funding of AMISOM personnel stipends for over a decade. As of January 2016, the European Union implemented a 20 per cent reduction in its funding of AMISOM troop stipends. Efforts to raise voluntary contributions to address the 20 per cent gap have been unsuccessful thus far, as have efforts to identify alternate resources to complement European Union funding.

Al-Shabaab remains a potent threat for stability in the country. The group maintains a force that allowed it to attack several AMISOM forward operating bases in the last years, and controls swathes of territory, in particular in the Juba Valley corridor and the Hiraan region, in which it administers basic services for the population. It also has the capability to launch large-scale complex terrorist attacks.

Yet, what ultimately undermines long-term progress on security in Somalia is not the presence of Al-Shabaab itself, but rather the lack of adequate Somali security institutions, underpinned by the requisite political agreements and financial resources, including to ensure regular payment of salaries, with appropriate governance, oversight and accountability mechanisms. This also undermines the Somali capacity to degrade Al-Shabaab in a meaningful way. The national security architecture is an important first step to address this deficit.

The primary responsibility for security lies with the Somali people and institutions. Accordingly, the joint review placed Somali ownership of the security sector at the centre of its planning, building on the tenets of the 16 April agreement. Unlike previous reviews that placed emphasis on degrading Al-Shabaab, this one focused on developing a transition plan for AMISOM to gradually hand over security tasks to Somali institutions, while also reviewing options for strengthening accountability measures and AMISOM effectiveness.

The joint review found that the Somalis have a genuine willingness to assume this responsibility. During the visit of the review team to Mogadishu, Somali officials and security experts presented a vision for progressively taking over security tasks in the period 2017-2021, based on the national security architecture and the security pact.

**Proposed transition plan**

AMISOM remains essential to ensuring security in Somalia in the medium term. This was also confirmed in the security pact adopted by 42 international partners in London on 11 May 2017. I am convinced that the continued presence of AMISOM, with progressively reduced troop levels, is necessary for the period 2017-2021 in order to consolidate the political and security gains achieved to date and to prevent any reversal of strategic importance. Meanwhile, a deliberate shift is required for the entire international security presence in Somalia towards adopting a support role, with Somali institutions now progressively assuming the primary responsibility for security.

In fact, elements of the transition have already begun. AMISOM has handed over tasks to Somali forces in a number of regional locations and in Mogadishu, including the protection of several federal ministries.

The members of the joint review team determined that no additional AMISOM troops would be required to undertake offensive operations against Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups. Alternative arrangements have been identified, including additional elements of the national security architecture and other Somali security capacities for joint operations, AMISOM troops freed up by handing over tasks to Somali security forces, the adoption of a gradual approach to offensive operations and enhanced bilateral support.

In its efforts to strengthen Somali ownership, AMISOM should focus on a number of adjusted tasks (see below for details), which should be aligned with the national security architecture, build on AMISOM strengths and focus on facilitating a viable, orderly and responsible transition.

As part of this transition, a reorganization and gradual reduction of AMISOM uniformed personnel should be initiated, consistent with the spirit of the national

security architecture, the security pact and the commitment of Somali leaders and the AMISOM troop-contributing countries for the earliest possible transfer of security responsibilities. In doing so, it is important that the substantial political and security gains achieved over the past 10 years are not undermined. The significant losses in lives, both of AMISOM and Somali military and civilian personnel, as well as the considerable investments in resources, should not go to waste.

The joint review proposes an overall reduction of 1,500 uniformed personnel by October 2018 as follows: in a first phase, and following the ongoing targeted offensive operations against Al-Shabaab jointly undertaken with Somali forces (including in the Juba River Valley), AMISOM military personnel would be reduced by 1,000, no later than December 2017. Of those, 500 would be replaced by AMISOM police personnel to enhance the capacity of the Somali police countrywide, building on the excellent work done by the AMISOM police component. This would serve the objective of enabling the Somali police to assume expanded security tasks as part of the transition plan. Strengthening the primacy of the Somali police in law enforcement, rule of law and public safety, as specified in the national security architecture NSA, is critical. The 500 additional police would consist of two additional formed police units of 160 personnel each, 120 individual police officers and 60 formed police unit personnel, to bring the three existing formed police units to the standard number of 160 personnel. Therefore, factoring in the replacement of 500 troops with police, an overall reduction of 500 uniformed personnel by December 2017 is recommended by the joint review.

In a second phase, AMISOM military strength would be reduced by an additional 1,000 troops no later than October 2018. It is recommended that another joint review be undertaken in mid-2018 to take stock of the implementation of the transition strategy thus far and to plan the next stages of the transition. Further reductions in uniformed personnel after October 2018 will be considered and would take place in phases as security conditions and Somali capabilities allow.

Detailed technical transition planning will be determined following the completion of a joint verification exercise of the Somali security forces. This exercise, co-led by the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States, together with AMISOM and the United Nations, will build on previous initiatives conducted by AMISOM, United Nations entities and international partners. The verification will focus on determining numbers, capabilities, locations and compliance with human rights and other international standards (including screening for child soldiers, the existence of accountability mechanisms and levels of vetting and training), and include entities of the national security architecture and the Somali police as well as other Somali security capacities. Priority will be given to those forces slated for participation in joint operations. The verification exercise will also determine the methodology and technical conditions for handing over specific security tasks.

The resulting transition plan should be sufficiently flexible to allow for accelerated progress in building Somali security capabilities and be responsive to unforeseen negative security developments. It must also assure sufficient space and support for necessary political and reconciliation processes. Opportunities to accelerate the transition of security responsibility to the Somalis, for example as a result of military operations or reconciliation of local conflicts, should be encouraged and exploited.

Owing to the different speeds at which security sector reform and the underlying political processes advance in various locations, the implementation of the proposed transition plan will need to be undertaken in a differentiated and synchronized manner in various parts of the country. The transition plan should also

consider how Somali logistical capacity can be strengthened, including the assumption of tasks currently carried out by UNSOS.

Continued AMISOM mentoring and rapid reaction capacities are likely to be required during and immediately following the 2021 elections. AMISOM troop strength would be reduced considerably thereafter, no later than 2022. A residual quick reaction force for a further 12-month period may have to be considered, if absolutely necessary, to support Somali security forces in responding to emerging challenges.

Within the context of the comprehensive approach to security, the broad set of circumstances for complementing the transition is of a political, security and financial nature.

The political circumstances include the following: (a) the federal structure, including the status of Federal Member States, is formalized; (b) outstanding issues pertaining to the national security architecture are addressed, in particular with regard to numbers, roles and responsibilities of the security services of the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States; (c) key legislation is adopted and institutions are capacitated, consistent with the national security architecture, in particular the formalization of the National Security Council; (d) major inter-clan conflicts have been addressed to a level that can be managed by Somali political and security structures; (e) elections are conducted successfully and there is a peaceful transition of power; and (f) relations of Somalia with its immediate neighbours are stable.

The security elements to be in place include: (a) Somali security capabilities are developed, equipped and sustained to a level commensurate with local and countrywide threats, pursuant to the national security architecture, with command and control arrangements that are implemented and functional, and personnel regularly receiving rations and salaries; and (b) Al-Shabaab is degraded and contained to a level at which Somali forces can respond within their own capabilities.

The financial aspects include the ability of the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States to progressively generate the requisite resources to pay salaries and establish transparent and accountable payment systems that will ensure the regular disbursement of salaries for security personnel, consistent with the national security architecture. In the interim, uniform, transparent and accountable financial mechanisms must be established by Somali institutions and partners for the payment of stipends. The work done by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) in this regard, with support from partners, is commendable.

This transition plan can only be implemented if comprehensive funding is mobilized for the Somali security sector and for AMISOM. Approximate costing for building the Somali security sector must be established with a plan on how to share the burden prior to the London follow-on conference, scheduled for the end of 2017, at which resources for the Somali security sector will be mobilized to ensure adequate financial and in-kind commitments, both from Somali and international contributions.

Predictable and sustainable funding for AMISOM is imperative to avoid risks pertaining to a precipitous or premature withdrawal, which, in all likelihood, would reverse the considerable political and security gains achieved over the last decade. Funding arrangements for AMISOM should be explored in earnest, bearing in mind the full range of options available to the United Nations and to other partners,

including United Nations assessed contributions and considering the limitations of voluntary funding that have come to light.

**Proposed revised tasks for AMISOM**

In line with the above transition plan, I support the recommendation of the joint review that AMISOM shift towards a more supportive role, with Somali forces taking the lead in carrying out security tasks. AMISOM would build on its proven strengths in the asymmetrical threat environment in which it operates.

The following core tasks geared towards facilitating the transition are proposed for AMISOM: (a) protecting main population centres and the presence of international actors, securing and enabling political processes, reconciliation, maintenance of law and order, early recovery and public safety, while prudently implementing a transfer of responsibilities to Somali forces; (b) contributing effectively to securing the main supply routes, beginning with those that link population centres; (c) conducting targeted operations against Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups, jointly with Somali forces and with appropriate mitigation measures in place, while continuing the mentoring role during combat operations, as well as the provision of operational support to Somali forces; and (d) contributing to capacity-building and training of the Somali police, in close collaboration with UNSOM and in line with the national security architecture .

The AMISOM civilian component should be fully operationalized so that it may reach its projected strength and refocus its efforts on supporting the revised tasks of the AMISOM military and police components, i.e. mission support, human rights compliance and supporting enhanced coordination and coherence between the United Nations and the African Union in Somalia. Particular emphasis should be placed on enhancing the staffing of its human rights component, with a view to increasing capacity to monitor and strengthen compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law and to address cases of violations.

Based on the above, a revision of the AMISOM concept of operations is recommended, in close consultation with the relevant counterparts in the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States, as well as UNSOS. AMISOM should also review its operational equipment requirements in the light of the proposed revised tasks and updated threat assessments.

The Somali police plays a critical part in AMISOM transition planning and the wider security strategy for Somalia. Considering that under the national security architecture it is foreseen that 32,000 Somali police will shoulder the main responsibility for security in cities, towns and villages, support to the Somali police should increase considerably and is likely to be required for the foreseeable future. Unlike the military, the Somali police component, where deployed, is already in charge of its responsibilities, and a transfer from AMISOM is therefore not required. Moreover, the police component is expected to play the most important role in securing political and reconciliation processes in the future.

On the one hand, the AMISOM police component has proven its comparative advantage in assisting with the vetting, recruitment, training and mentoring of police officers and in providing operational support. The successful AMISOM programme should be expanded with the resources outlined above. On the other hand, UNSOM has proven successful in providing policy advice for the roll-out of the new policing model and the establishment of institutional police structures at the level of the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States. This political effort, underpinned with technical advice, is closely linked to other core tasks of UNSOM, including supporting the federalism process, the constitutional review, the development of a justice and corrections model for Somalia and

addressing outstanding issues related to the national security architecture. It is therefore my hope that the Security Council will fully endorse the recommendation to replace 500 of the first 1,000 military personnel of AMISOM by the end of 2017 and consider strengthening the UNSOM policing mandate to enhance its capacity to provide advice for the establishment of institutional structures under the new policing model, which would require a modest increase in resources for the UNSOM police component. The AMISOM and UNSOM police components should continue to strengthen their collaboration.

A review of the current AMISOM and UNSOM strategic communications capacity and direction is required to maximize the use of available resources, including efforts to explain the transition process, to encourage support for the transition and to counter any possible narrative of a gradual AMISOM withdrawal being a victory for Al-Shabaab.

I recognize the progress made by AMISOM in complying with human rights and international humanitarian law. The joint review determined that AMISOM and, where relevant, the African Union and troop/police-contributing countries, should accelerate efforts to enhance the effectiveness of measures and mechanisms designed to prevent and address violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including on the basis of specific recommendations made during the joint review (and compiled in a table annexed to the present letter (see annex IV)) aimed at strengthening selection and screening, training, accountability, monitoring and reporting (including the civilian casualty tracking and analysis response cell), planning mechanisms, as well as rules and regulations.

**Strategic monitoring and accountability**

The joint review recommends that the existing joint African Union-United Nations working group on Somalia, with representation at Headquarters and in the field (UNSOM, UNSOS and AMISOM), with the participation of partners, as appropriate, should play a central role in monitoring the progress against the trajectory outlined above at a strategic level. It should provide regular periodic reports to the African Union-United Nations Joint Task Force. This will allow for a timely response to developments, the mitigation of risks and a regular review of numbers of authorized personnel as conditions for transferring tasks are met. The Joint African Union-United Nations working group would closely cooperate with the implementation structures under the comprehensive approach to security, as appropriate.

Through its respective leadership in Addis Ababa (the African Union Peace and Security Department and UNOAU at the appropriate level), the working group could provide informal briefings to troop/police-contributing countries, members of the African Union Peace and Security Council and the United Nations Security Council, as appropriate. The African Union Commission may need enhanced support to effectively engage in the monitoring and continuous planning processes that this transition requires.

The joint review recommends that the senior leadership coordination forum in Mogadishu be strengthened as part of efforts to ensure greater alignment of priorities, strategic coherence and closer follow-up. In this respect, the joint review proposes, from within existing resources, the establishment of a dedicated joint secretariat to prepare the meetings of the coordination forum and follow up on the implementation of its decisions. The joint review strongly supports the continuation of the joint briefings of the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia to the Security Council and to the African Union Peace and

Security Council. In line with the joint African Union-United Nations framework for an enhanced partnership on peace and security, the Secretariat will work with the African Union Commission on modalities for a strengthened interaction with the respective policy organs to ensure greater strategic coherence.

AMISOM and UNSOS are implementing several measures to strengthen accountability and efficiency in their management of resources and finances. A joint mission support committee will provide the platform for improved transparency and enable advanced planning. Commodity and personnel management, as well as service delivery functions at each mission, are being co-located to the fullest extent possible. This will improve monitoring, analysis and reporting on logistics support performance and inform joint decision-making to better align funding and resources with prioritized AMISOM activities. Specific details of the agreed measures are annexed to the present letter (see annex IV.B).

The United Nations logistical support, as currently delivered by UNSOS, will need to be reviewed in the light of the AMISOM transition planning, once approved, as well as agreements among Somalis and international partners within the context of the comprehensive approach to security.

The joint review recommends the creation of a joint United Nations/Federal Government of Somalia human rights due diligence policy working group, with the full participation of the African Union, in order to ensure that measures to mitigate risks identified under the policy are reviewed regularly and that the implementation of such measures are jointly monitored.

**Observations**

I wish to convey my deep gratitude to the African Union Commission for the strong collaboration and partnership that characterized this major joint effort. I would also like to thank the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States, members of the Security Council, representatives of the European Union and other international partners for their participation in the work of the joint team. I commend the leadership of AMISOM, UNSOM and UNSOS for their relentless efforts to enhance coherence and collaboration, in particular through joint arrangements.

The courage and heroism of the Somali security forces and the AMISOM military and police personnel deserve our collective tribute. Thanks to their sacrifices, and the sustained commitment of its partners, Somalia is undoubtedly on a path free from conflict.

I commend the decision of the joint review to place Somali ownership at the core of the review. The elections, the peaceful handover of power, the establishment of the National Security Council with comprehensive membership and the agreement on the national security architecture are milestone achievements. Only sustained Somali commitment and increased compliance with human rights and the rule of law can build on these accomplishments and considerably accelerate security sector reform. With regard to the required equipment, infrastructure and sustainment support for the Somali forces, I agree with the conclusion of the joint review that this effort is best left to the consideration of the international partners.

I fully concur with the conclusion of the joint review that the presence of AMISOM in Somalia is necessary at this delicate point in time, although it will be reduced over time as part of a transition process anchored in the national security architecture. I see no other viable alternative if we are to prevent a reversal of strategic importance — an outcome that would be disastrous for the Somali people who have gone through untold hardship over the past two decades, and also for the

international community that has invested so much in resources and lives. Moreover, a hasty drawdown of AMISOM and an unorganized handover to Somali security institutions is likely to affect the gains and result in a situation that may necessitate yet another international security deployment in Somalia. The presence of AMISOM in the years ahead will without doubt help to create the space required for the Somali forces to increase their capabilities and their confidence and meet the challenges at hand.

The presence of AMISOM and its sustained funding are intertwined. There will be no AMISOM presence, absent a solution that ensures predictable and sustainable funding. Irrespective of the tool, it is imperative that this objective be achieved, either from voluntary or assessed contributions from the United Nations. I am hopeful that following this review, an arrangement to this effect can be agreed upon, one that meets the legitimate expectations of the African Union and AMISOM troop-contributing countries that have made enormous sacrifices in the pursuit of peace and security in Somalia.

In this regard, I urge Member States and partners to review their funding plans. It is my hope that the proposed transition planning, including the increased transparency and accountability measures, will encourage predictable and sustainable voluntary funding. I will consult with the African Union and all key partners concerning the future funding of AMISOM and will report back to the Security Council by November 2017.

I also wish to emphasize that, given the critical necessity that all security operations be carried out in compliance with human rights and other international standards, it is essential that AMISOM, with the support of the United Nations, give priority to implementing the recommendations made by the joint review on the human rights compliance framework. Compliance with the human rights due diligence policy in the context of United Nations support to the transition of responsibilities between AMISOM and Somali security forces will be the cornerstone of the partnership between the United Nations, the African Union, the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States.

I fully support the strategy proposed by the joint review with respect to the transition. Close monitoring and improved overall efficiency is likely to generate accelerated progress and elicit additional support. The trajectory recommended by the joint review for downsizing AMISOM was planned carefully and prudently, taking into consideration that confidence in the Somali security institutions will grow progressively. I wholeheartedly agree that the transition must be transparent, viable, responsible and orderly, and that it requires sufficient flexibility and patience.

I am delighted to see that AMISOM and UNSOM assistance to developing Somali police institutions, supported by partners, has resulted in important steps in the right direction. Without adequate support to implementing the new policing model, this remarkable political achievement may come to naught. I therefore strongly urge members of the Security Council to seriously consider authorizing enhanced support to both operational and policy advice to the Somali police, at the federal and Federal Member State levels, bearing in mind the importance of effective Somali police institutions for a successful transition.

I urge the Federal Government and Federal Member States to assume security responsibilities throughout Somalia within the earliest possible time frame, without jeopardizing the gains achieved. The national security architecture provides a legal and organizational framework around which international support for security sector development can be more coordinated and more coherent, and therefore impactful. A strong and efficient Somali security sector is also subject to enhanced governance

and accountability mechanisms in line with basic international standards. I agree with the joint review that immediate steps required to sustain the current momentum include political discussions to address outstanding details in the national security architecture, its operationalization, and Somali institutions actively co-leading the joint verification exercise.

This is the time when all partners must commit to the implementation of the national security architecture and align their support accordingly. In turn, the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States have to ensure the regular payments of salaries in a transparent and accountable manner.

With respect to the integration of security forces, I reiterate the recommendation in my letter to the President of the Security Council dated 2 July 2015, encouraging the Federal Government to favourably consider the full and formal integration of 3,000 Puntland forces into the Somalia National Army on a priority basis. If adequately supported by partners, a comprehensive training and equipment package, linked to the regular payment of salaries, may set a model to be replicated elsewhere in the country. This support will also enhance Puntland's response to terrorist attacks.

Successful stabilization and consolidation efforts, including the delivery of basic services, are subject to establishing local governance structures, and they will require improved collaboration among key actors. Those efforts should focus on priority areas agreed by the Somali people, including main population centres where the security environment allows international actors to operate, and from which services should expand gradually to surrounding districts. Moreover, efforts should focus on regions where conditions enable rapid progress.

The community recovery and extension of state authority and accountability initiative, which represents the United Nations approach to supporting stabilization and the extension of State authority in Somalia, aims at assisting in the establishment of credible, representative and functional sub-federal administrations that mitigate conflict, instil confidence among the population in State structures and improve the lives of the Somali people. It is imperative that these efforts are sequenced with targeted military operations.

It is my sincere hope that the friends of Somalia around the globe will sustain their support for this final phase of AMISOM and for the creation of Somali security institutions that can take over from AMISOM. This is not the time to relent. Much has been achieved, but the political and security gains remain tenuous and reversible. We must not allow the substantial investments in lives and resources for over two decades to go to waste. I therefore urge the Security Council to endorse the recommendations contained in the present letter.

I would be grateful if you could bring the present letter and its annexes to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) António **Guterres**

## Annex I

# Communique of the African Union Peace and Security Council

**Adopted at its 700th meeting, Addis Ababa, 12 July 2017**

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU), at its 700th meeting held on 12 July 2017, adopted the following decision on the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on AU-United Nations (UN) Joint Review on the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the renewal of the mandate of AMISOM and on the report on the 10-Year Lessons Learned Review Conference on AMISOM:

**Council,**

1. **Takes note** of the report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the AU-UN Joint Review on AMISOM and the report on the 10-Year Lessons Learned Review Conference on AMISOM, as well as the statement made by Ambassador Smaïl Chergui, Commissioner for Peace and Security, and the briefing by the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission in Somalia and Head of AMISOM, Ambassador Francisco Madeira. Council also takes note of the statements made by the representatives of Ethiopia, in its capacity as Chair of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Italy, as co-Chair of IGAD Partner Forum, United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), as well as UN Security Council (UNSC) Permanent Members, namely China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America;

2. **Recalls** its previous pronouncements on the situation in Somalia and AMISOM, including Communique PSC/PR/COMM(DCLXXXIV) adopted at its 684th meeting held on 28 April 2017; Communique PSC/PR/COMM(DCXLIX) adopted at its 649th meeting held on 16 January 2017; Communique PSC/PR/COMM(DCXXII) adopted at its 622nd meeting held on 6 September 2016; Communique PSC/PR/COMM(DCVIII) adopted at its 608th meeting held on 29 June 2016; and Communique PSC/PR/COMM.2(DXCV) adopted at its 595th meeting held on 28 April 2016;

3. **Further recalls** paragraph 11 of the communique of its 622nd meeting held on 6 September 2016, requesting the Commission to conduct a comprehensive lessons learned exercise which will identify progress made, challenges encountered and more importantly recommendations on the way forward in the future of AMISOM, including the Mission exit strategy. Council also recalls paragraph 10 of the communique of its 684th meeting held on 28 April 2017, underscoring the Importance of the conduct of an AU-UN Joint Strategic Review on AMISOM, in defining the future of AMISOM presence in Somalia, and noting that the review will provide an opportunity to review and define tasks, as well as options for the reconfiguration of AMISOM;

4. **Commends** the Commission for the successful conduct of the 10-Year Lessons Learned study on AMISOM, as well as the AU-UN Joint Review on AMISOM. Council further commends the Federal Government of Somalia, the UN, Troop and Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs) and bilateral partners for their commitments and cooperation extended to the AU-UN Joint Review Team prior to, and during the conduct of both exercises;

5. **Reiterates** the main outcomes of the meeting of AMISOM's T/PCCs, in the margins of the 29th Ordinary Session of AU Assembly, held on 3 July 2017, which, *inter alia*, requested the Commission, to establish a Committee of Experts to develop a Joint AU/T/PCCs Exit Strategy, Council **underscores** that the development of such an exit strategy, is complementary and should build on the

outcomes of the Ten Year Lessons Learned Exercise and the AU-UN Joint Review. In this respect, Council **stresses the importance** of an AMISOM transition plan that is based on a realistic timeframe and the attainment of the key security conditions suggested by the AU-UN Joint review, in order to ensure a sustained progress in the political and economic developments in Somalia;

6. **Endorses** the report of the AMISOM 10-Year Lessons Learned, in particular its main conclusion that AMISOM has been successful in the implementation of its mandate including through the facilitation of an enabling environment for two political transitions in Somalia. In this regard, Council **further recognizes** that AMISOM remains an indispensable partner for peace in Somalia but needs to be property reconfigured to support the next phase of state building in 5omalia during the course of the implementation of the transitional plan;

7. **Pays tribute** to the heavy sacrifices made by AMISOM T/PCCs, especially those that have paid the ultimate price for the promotion of peace, security, stability and reconciliation in Somalia. Council **renews** AMISOM's commitment to support the Federal Government of Somalia and interim member states in accordance with the highest professional standards mindful of AU's Zero's Tolerance Policy against all forms of misconduct and abuse;

8. **Reiterates** its gratitude to the UN, the EU and other bilateral partners in supporting AMISOM operations against Al-Shabaab, as well as their financial and material support to AMISOM and the Federal Government of Somalia;

9. **Commends** the Federal Government of Somalia for its commitment to fostering sustainable peace in Somalia. In this respect, Council **welcomes** the leadership of President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed Farmajo in promoting an inclusive political dialogue between the federal government and the interim federal states through the rapid formation of the National Security Council, as well as in the commencement of the implementation of the 17 April 2017 agreement on the National Security Architecture as reflected in the Communique of the National Security Council following its meeting in Mogadishu, from 5 to 10 July 2017. Council, **reiterates** its commitment to continue supporting the Federal Government of Somalia in achieving its security and political milestones and **urges** the Federal Government of Somalia to spare no effort in the protection of civilians, the promotion of respect for human rights and the advancement of sustainable peace and economic growth in Somalia;

10. **Takes note with serious concern** that that Al-Shabaab terrorist group continues to represent a threat to peace, security and stability in Somalia, to the region and, to the wider international community;

11. **Welcomes** the findings of the AU-UN Joint Review especially the political determination of the Federal Government of Somalia to assume primarily security responsibilities from AMISOM, based on a responsible, viable and realistic transition plan;

12. **Endorses** the recommendations made by the AU-UN Joint Review on a gradual and phased reduction and reorganization of AMISOM's uniformed personnel aimed at providing a greater support role, with Somali National Security Forces progressively taking the lead in undertaking security tasks in the country. In this respect, Council underlines the need to avoid any security vacuum that could undermine the hard won gains made so far in Somalia;

13. **Decides** to renew the mandate of AMISOM for 12 months, until 31 July 2018, based on the following revised core tasks:

a. Continue to support political dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia;

b. Protect main population centers and the presence of international actors, securing and enabling political processes, reconciliation, maintenance of law and order, early recovery and public safety, while prudently mentoring Somali security entities in implementing a transfer of responsibilities to Somali National Security Force (SNSF);

c. Contribute to securing the main supply routes beginning with those linking main population centers through joint operations with Somali forces;

d. Conduct targeted operations against Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups, jointly with Somali forces, continue mentoring during combat operations and provide operational support to Somali forces;

e. Support capacity building at various levels of SNSF, in line with the National Security Architecture and in full coordination with UN and other relevant partners;

f. Facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and support to early recovery and extension of state authority, within available resources of the Mission;

14. **Requests** the Commission to work closely with the Federal Government of Somalia, the T/PCCs, the UN and other relevant international partners, to revise the AMISOM's Concept of Operations, in light of the proposed revised mandate, an updated threat assessment, a review of the Mission's operational requirements and a revised transition plan based on the time period from 2017 to 2021, in line with the request by the Federal Government of Somalia and the recommendations made by the AU-UN Joint Review. In this regard, Council underscores the imperative of addressing current AMISOM capabilities gaps through the generation of additional enablers and force multiplier, in order to enhance the Mission's operational effectiveness;

15. **Further requests** the Commission and AMISOM to work closely with the Federal Government of Somalia and the UN to ensure the urgent completion of the ongoing joint physical verification, to be submitted to Council, of Somalia National Army and Somalia Police Force, across all sectors of operations, to allow for the identification of critical capabilities gaps that should be addressed in order to ensure effective joint operations as part of the overall capacity building of the Somali national security institutions;

16. **Expresses concern** at the lack of coordination and coherence in the support to the building of a capable and inclusive Somalia security sector, which could delay the progress required in facilitating effective assumption of full responsibility by the Somalia national security institutions from AMISOM, Council **stresses the need** for partners to work closely with the Somali authorities and AMISOM in ensuring enhanced coordination of support including in the conduct of bilateral capacity building initiatives and offensive operations. Council **welcomes** the establishment of the Somalia-African Union Taskforce as a credible coordination mechanism for support to the enhancement of the Somali security sector;

17. **Further stresses the need** for a responsive, effective, efficient and responsible field support platform as a strategic enabler to AMISOM operations. In this regard, Council **requests** the United Nations Support Office to Somalia (UNSOS) to continue to enhance its delivery of support package to AMISOM, taking into account the need to reinforce the role of the AU Special Representative

and Head of AMISOM to this effect, in line with the 2016 Memorandum of Understanding between the AU and UN on the provision of support to AMISOM;

18. **Emphasizes** that the continued presence of AMISOM in Somalia and the implementation of a viable transition necessitates the securing of predictable and sustainable funding for AMISOM and Somali security institutions. Council **takes note** of steps taken by the Commission in addressing current resource gaps and **requests** the Commission to enhance engagements with the UN Secretary General and other partners, at the required level, in securing predictable and sustainable funding for AMISOM, including through the utilization of UN Assessed contributions for the payment of stipends for AMISOM uniformed personnel, and bearing in mind the successes made by the Mission, the transition time-frame proposed by the AU-UN Joint Review and, the reality that AMISOM represents an exemplary AU-UN strategic and operational partnership in the implementation of Chapter VIM of the UN Charter and in the spirit of the UN-AU Joint Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, signed on 19 April 2017;

19. **Urges** the UNSC to consider, at the earliest possible timeframe, the report of the AU-UN Joint Review and to endorse its recommendations, in order to pave the way for its speedy and effective implementation, taking into consideration the need to avoid a security vacuum in Somalia and the region, enhance coordination efforts and ensure predictable funding for AMISOM;

20. **Requests** the Commission to transmit this Communique, the report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the AU-UN Joint Review of AMISOM and the report on the 10-Year Lessons Learned on AMISOM to the UN Secretary-General for onward transmission to the UNSC for its action, as appropriate;

21. **Decides** to remain actively seized of the matter.

## Annex II

# Report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the African Union-United Nations joint review of the African Union Mission in Somalia

## I. Introduction

1. On 7 July 2016, the United Nations Security Council, by its resolution 2297 (2016), requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with the African Union (AU) Commission, to conduct a joint assessment mission of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), after the 2016 electoral process in Somalia. The purpose of the joint assessment was to ensure that AMISOM is properly configured to support the next phase of State-building in Somalia, and to present options and recommendations to the Peace and Security Council and the United Nations Security Council. At its 684th meeting, held on 28 April 2017, the Peace and Security Council "underscored the importance of the upcoming AU-United Nations joint strategic review on Somalia in defining the future of AMISOM presence in Somalia". The Council furthermore "noted that the review will provide an opportunity to review and redefine tasks, as well as options for the reconfiguration of AMISOM".

2. The present report provides an update on the key findings and recommendations of the AU-United Nations joint review of AMISOM, which was conducted in Mogadishu, Somalia and Addis Ababa from 15 to 29 May 2017. It also provides concluding observations on the way forward.

## II. Context of the African Union-United Nations joint review

3. In 2013 and 2015, two AU-UN joint benchmarking assessments were conducted to determine whether the security conditions were conducive for a transition of AMISOM to a United Nations peacekeeping mission. Both assessments concluded that the security conditions were not met for a transition of AMISOM to a United Nations peacekeeping mission. Accordingly, AMISOM's continued presence has remained central for providing an enabling security environment and facilitating political processes in Somalia. In this respect, AMISOM has significantly degraded the threats posed by Al-Shabaab, especially the ability of the terrorist group to maintain territorial control in Somalia. Yet, the security situation remains fluid and often characterized by asymmetrical attacks by Al-Shabaab against civilian populations, Somali National Security Forces (SNSF) and AMISOM personnel.

4. Politically, the outcome of the Parliamentary and Presidential elections in 2016-2017 is an indication of the continued relevance of AMISOM in facilitating political processes and inclusive dialogue in Somalia. The establishment of a bicameral assembly and the election of President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed Farmajo in February 2017 marked the completion of the unique electoral process in Somalia. Despite the successes registered by AMISOM in contributing to the foundation for security and political gains, the mission continues to face significant operational challenges, including, notably, the decision of the European Union to reduce the troop allowance by 20 per cent in January 2016. Efforts to raise voluntary contributions to bridge this gap have not been successful, which has led to the significant under-resourcing and reduced the morale of AMISOM troops.

5. It is against this background that the Peace and Security Council, at its 608th meeting, held on 29 June 2016, took note of the indicative timelines of the AMISOM exit strategy presented by the AU Commission. The strategy prioritized territorial recovery and consolidation by AMISOM and the Somali National Security Forces until October 2018, and a subsequent drawdown and transfer of security responsibilities to the Security Forces from 2018 to December 2020. The importance of an AMISOM exit strategy based on the indicative timelines was reiterated during the Council's 622rd meeting, held on 6 September 2016, and the Council also requested the AU Commission to conduct a comprehensive lessons learned exercise, which would identify progress made, challenges encountered and recommend options on the way forward in the future of AMISOM, including the mission exit strategy.

6. In this regard, at a number of consultations that took place over the course of early 2017 various critical issues were discussed, including the approaching time-bound withdrawal of AMISOM. The AMISOM lessons learned review Conference of 9 and 10 March 2017 emphasized that AMISOM should adopt a conditions-based exit strategy based on clear set of criteria for effective drawdown and eventual exit. Meanwhile, the AU-led high-level consultation on AMISOM and the support to security institutions and reform in Somalia held on 23 March 2017 concluded that, among other things, the role of AMISOM will continue to be relevant after 2018. From these consultations, a consensus emerged that there should be a move from a purely time-bound to a time- and condition- based withdrawal of AMISOM, with an emphasis on the urgent need to develop capable Somali security institutions for a successful transition of security responsibilities in Somalia.

7. On 16 April 2017, a historical agreement was reached between the Federal Government of Somalia and the interim Federal Member States on Somalia's national security architecture. It laid out a unified security structure, including the size of the Somali National Army and combined Federal and State Police, as well as their distribution, composition, command and control and financing. The national security architecture, which was endorsed by Somalia's National Security Council on 8 May 2017, formed the basis of the security pact agreed upon between Somalia and international partners at the London conference on Somalia, held on 11 May 2017. These reflect collective determination by the Somali leadership and international partners to put Somali ownership at the forefront of all security discussions, as the sustainable way to consolidate political and security gains made thus far.

8. The AU-United Nations joint review was conducted taking into account the above context, in particular the agreement on the national security architecture and the political position of the Federal Government of Somalia to assume security responsibilities directly from AMISOM based on a responsible, viable and realistic transition plan.

## III. Objectives of the African Union-United Nations joint review

9. The AU-United Nations joint review was conducted from 15 to 29 May 2017, co-led by the AU Commission and the United Nations Secretariat. The AU Commission transmitted, in a note verbal dated 3 May 2017, the concept note and terms of reference of the joint review to all member States of the AU Peace and Security Council. In Addis Ababa, on 15 May 2017, the joint review team also briefed AMISOM troop- and police- contributing countries on the objectives and expected outcomes of the exercise. The European Union, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States of America also participated in the AU-United Nations joint review process.

10. The AU-United Nations joint review had a three-fold objective to: (a) assist Somali stakeholders from the Federal and sub-federal levels to elaborate an implementation roadmap/ plan, likely in phases, based on the 17 April agreement; (b) propose options for AMISOM, the United Nations and other international partners to assist in implementing the road map, including options for AMISOM reconfiguration, hence articulating the conditions upon which a transition plan for AMISOM is to be agreed; and (c) lay out the elements for support to AMISOM (including funding), tied to the implementation of the transition plan.

## IV. Methodology

11. Specifically, in order to achieve the above, the AU-United Nations joint review:

(a) Assessed progress towards achieving the security strategy articulated in Security Council resolution 2232 (2015), following the communique of the AU Peace and Security Council adopted at its 521st meeting, held on 30 June 2015, and subsequently elaborated in the 2016 AMISOM concept of operations, including through the conduct of an assessment of AMISOM and the Somali security forces, to the extent possible;

(b) Taking into consideration the AMISOM lessons learned Exercise and the United Nations strategic assessment, devise a security strategy, specifically to:

(i) Continue to contain and degrade the threat of Al-Shabaab;

(ii) Provide an enabling environment for the peace, extension of state services and authority and state-building processes;

(iii) Explore available options for the provision of predictable and sustainable financing to AMISOM to meet the critical conditions for a responsible takeover by the Somali National Security Forces;

(iv) Develop parameters to adjust AMISOM and international security support to the current developments, notably a condition-based takeover of primary security responsibilities by the Somali National Security Forces, including through the development of adequate and comprehensive strategies to support the effective capacity-building of inclusive, capable Somali National Security Forces aligned with the national security architecture;

(c) Also examined AU-United Nations structures to provide strategic management and oversight of the mission, as well as ensure accountability and necessary coordination.

12. In fulfilling these objectives, the AU-United Nations joint review undertook a wide range of consultations in Addis Ababa and Mogadishu. It had the opportunity to meet with the Prime Minister of the Federal Government of Somalia, Hassan Ali Khayre, held a three-day dialogue with the National Security Adviser of the Federal Government of Somalia, the national Police Commissioner and Deputy Police Commissioner, the Director General of the Ministry of the Interior, representatives of the Ministry of Defense, representatives of the National Intelligence Service Agency and representatives of the interim Federal Member States, namely, Galmudug, Hirshabelle, Jubaland and South West, it also met with representatives of AMISOM, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the United Nations Office of Project Services (UNOPS), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS).

## V. Key findings of the joint review

13. The AU-United Nations joint review submitted the following key findings:

(a) Somalia has made important progress on the political front in the last few months. In particular, the 16 April 2017 agreement on the main principles of the national security architecture, which provides a strong basis for the support of the Somali security sector;

(b) There is strong declared resolve and agreement by the Federal Government of Somalia and the interim Federal Member States on the need to commence a structured and responsible transfer of AMISOM security responsibilities to the Somali National Security Forces;

(c) AMISOM has succeeded in contributing to peace, security and stability in Somalia over the last decade. AMISOM interventions have prevented Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups from taking over the country and have recovered significant territories, thereby providing secure space and the foundation for State-building and peacebuilding. This has included reconciliation and other political processes, resulting in, among other things, in the establishment of a federal map, administrations in five interim Federal Member States and a federal Government that enjoys legitimacy throughout Somalia;

(d) AMISOM has also facilitated humanitarian relief, particularly through the securing of main supply routes, to enable the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance;

(e) There is significant progress in compliance with human rights and international humanitarian law by AMISOM, with the operationalization of the Civilian Causalities Tracking and Analysis Cell and the setting up of the CEEBLA crisis hotline as notable achievements;

(f) In view of the growing capabilities of the Somali National Security Forces, no additional AMISOM troops will be required to undertake operations. Nevertheless, AMISOM remains essential to ensure security in Somalia in the medium term. AMISOM's continued presence is necessary for the period 2017-2021 to consolidate the political and security gains so far achieved. A strategic shift is required, however, towards adopting a support role, with Somalis assuming greater leadership and responsibility for security. This necessitates that AMISOM perform a number of modified tasks, which are aligned with the national security architecture and focused on facilitating a viable, orderly and responsible transition. Indeed, elements of a transition have already begun, with Somali forces taking over tasks in a number of locations in the regions and in Mogadishu, such as the protection of several Federal Ministries;

(g) As part of this transition, a reorganization and gradual reduction of AMISOM uniformed personnel should be established in phases, consistent with the implementation of the national security architecture and the commitment and capability of Somalis and troop- and police-contributing countries, in order to provide for the earliest possible transfer of security responsibilities. However, the risks of reversing the substantial political and security gains achieved over the past 10 years must be avoided, especially considering the significant investment in lives and resources;

(h) There is an urgent need for verification of the Somali National Security Forces to assess their strength and capabilities at the national and state level;

There is a need to enhance the capabilities as well as financial and logistical support for both AMISOM and the SNSF to allow for effective joint operations.

14. In order to ensure a smooth transition, detailed planning is required, based on the completion of a joint physical verification exercise of the Somali security forces, expected to be completed no later than 1 September 2017. This joint physical verification will be co-led by the Federal Government of Somalia and the interim Federal Member States, together with AMISOM and the United Nations. It will build on previous initiatives conducted by AMISOM, United Nations entities and international partners. It will determine the methodology and conditions for handing over specific security tasks, differentiated by each of the interim Federal Member States. The verification will focus on determining numbers, capabilities and locations and include the Somali National Army, regional forces in favour of integration and the police, prioritizing those forces participating in joint operations. The more detailed transition plan should be sufficiently flexible to allow for accelerated progress in building Somali security capabilities, but also to respond to unforeseen negative security developments.

## VI. Key conditions for transition and drawdown of AMISOM

15. Political, security and funding conditions will be imperative for completing the transition. The political conditions include, but are not limited to:

(a) The formalization of the federal structure;

(b) Addressing of outstanding issues relating to the national security architecture, in particular with regard to numbers, roles, and responsibilities of the Federal Government of Somalia and its security forces;

(c) Legitimation and capacitation of key institutions, especially the National Security Council;

(d) The conduct of elections and peaceful transfer of power in 2021.

16. Key security conditions include:

(a) The development of Somali security capabilities to a level commensurate with local and country wide threats;

(b) The degradation and containment of Al-Shabaab to a level at which Somalis can respond from within their own capabilities.

17. With regards to funding it was observed that:

(a) The establishment of transparent and accountable payment systems to ensure the regular disbursement of salaries for security personnel consistent with the national security architecture and a corresponding mechanism by Somali institutions and partners for the payment stipends are key;

(b) Securing of predictable and sustainable funding for AMISOM, possibly including United Nations assessed contributions, is imperative to avoid the risk of premature withdrawal before the end of 2018, which could reverse gains made over the past decade.

## VII. Recommendations of the African Union-United Nations joint review

18. The AU-United Nations joint review made key recommendations for consideration regarding the AMISOM drawdown and revised AMISOM tasks and other operational issues for the enhancement of the Mission's effectiveness.

19. In respect to the AMISOM drawdown, the following recommendations were made:

(a) The AU-United Nations joint review recommends a two-phased approach. During the first phase, as a first step, military forces should be reduced by 1,000 personnel by December 2017, following the completion of targeted offensive operations against Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups (including in the Juba corridor and the north-east coastline) jointly undertaken with Somali forces. AMISOM police personnel will be increased by 500,[a] to support the primacy of the Somali Police Forces in law enforcement, the rule of law and public safety, as specified in the national security architecture. In a second step, AMISOM military strength should be reduced by an additional 1,000 personnel, no later than October 2018;

(b) As part of phase two, further reductions of military personnel after October 2018 will be considered, following another AU-United Nations joint review by mid-2018. During and immediately following the 2021 elections, continued AMISOM mentoring and rapid reaction capacities are required. In this regard, the joint review recommends consideration of a quick reaction force for a further 12-month period to support Somali security forces in responding to emerging challenges.

20. On the proposed revised AMISOM tasks, the AU-United Nations joint review recommends that AMISOM shift towards a support role, with Somalis progressively taking the lead in undertaking security tasks. The review also proposes the following core tasks as part of the transition:

(a) Protect main population centres and the presence of international actors, securing and enabling political processes, reconciliation, maintenance of law and order, early recovery and public safety, while prudently implementing a transfer of responsibilities to the Somali National Security Forces;

(b) Contribute to securing the main supply routes, beginning with those linking the main population centres;

(c) Conduct targeted operations against Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups, jointly with Somali forces; continue mentoring during combat operations and provide operational support to Somali forces;

(d) Support capacity-building of the Somali National Security Forces, in line with the national security architecture.

21. The AMISOM civilian component will focus its efforts on its revised tasks, including supporting the revised tasks of the AMISOM military and police components, with the objective of facilitating the transition and eventual drawdown.

22. In the light of the proposed revised tasks and an updated threat assessment, the AU-United Nations joint review recommends a revision of the AMISOM concept of operations and, more specifically, a review of AMISOM requirements for operational equipment. These revised tasks will also necessitate a review of current AMISOM capacity to enhance its strategic and operational management, as well as operational effectiveness. A review of the current AMISOM communications capacity and direction is also required to maximize the use of available resources and more effectively explain and encourage support for the transition.

23. Other operational recommendations made by the AU-United Nations joint review team to enhance AMISOM's effectiveness include:

[a] Comprised of 2 additional Formed Police Units of 160 personnel each, 120 individual police officers and 60 formed police units personnel to bring the existing 3 formed police units to the standard number of 160 personnel.

(a) AMISOM should continue to strengthen the effectiveness of measures and mechanisms to prevent and address violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by its peacekeepers, with support from UNSOM, UNSOS, AU and United Nations Headquarters;

(b) The existing joint AU/United Nations working group on Somalia, inviting AU, the United Nations and national actors in Somalia, as appropriate, should be tasked with monitoring progress on the transition and provide regular periodic reports. This will allow for appropriate reaction to developments, the mitigation of risks and the regular review of the number of authorized personnel as conditions for transferring tasks are met;

(c) At mission level, the joint review proposes more frequent meetings of the Senior Coordination Leadership Forum: regularly agreeing on joint deliverables will have a considerable impact on AMISOM/UNSOM relations. AMISOM and UNSOS should establish enhanced tracking and management systems to improve accountability for resources. Appropriate AMISOM civilian support units should be co-located with UNSOS to the greatest extent possible so as to enable effective accountability and improved efficiency, while continuing to observe respective managerial reporting lines.

## VIII. Concluding observations

24. I am pleased with the role of AU in contributing to the political processes and security achievements in Somalia. The last decade since the deployment of AMISOM may have been characterized by challenges in operational capabilities of the mission, under-resourcing and significant loss of lives of AMISOM troops. Yet these challenges have not derailed Africa's collective resolve and focus of AMISOM to effectively implement its mandate. I therefore wish to commend all AU member States, in particular the troop-and police- contributing countries, namely Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, for the sacrifices made, and support provided to the people and Government of Somalia in order to restore peace, security, stability and development in the country. The AU Commission will spare no effort in ensuring that international support to AMISOM is enhanced, especially during this transition phase of the Mission.

25. I would like to underscore three main observations for the consideration of the Peace and Security Council, in its deliberations and decisions on the recently concluded AU-United Nations joint review.

26. First, the gradual drawdown and reconfiguration of AMISOM uniformed personnel is a manifestation of the mission's operational successes rather than a risk to security gains. The AU-United Nations joint review observed that AMISOM forces have already commenced transferring security responsibilities for the protection of Government installations to the Somali National Security Forces. In addition, cooperation between AMISOM police and the Somalia Police Force has yielded significant dividends in the areas of capacity-building, training and mentoring. The AMISOM civilian component has also demonstrated its relevance in facilitating the work of its uniformed counterpart, and also in the areas of early recovery and extension of State authority. Overall, the recommendation for the initial reduction of AMISOM's strength by 2,000 military personnel and a simultaneous deployment of an additional 500 police over the next 14 months is based on analysis that it will not compromise security gains in Somalia. Any further reduction will be dependent on the outcomes of a further joint AU-United Nations review of the threat assessment and general security conditions in Somalia.

Therefore, the Peace and Security Council may wish to endorse the recommendation on the phased reduction of AMISOM strength and consider revising the AMISOM mandate in the light of the proposed revised tasks of the mission.

27. Second, there is a clear recognition that adequate, predictable and sustainable funding for the Somali National Forces and AMISOM will be critical to the successful implementation of the transition plan. AMISOM continues to suffer from reduced and voluntary funding from partners notably the European Union. Indeed, we remain grateful for the voluntary support received, but it has not been sufficient. Given the progress made in the strategic partnership between the AU and the United Nations in the promotion of peace and security in Africa, the natural trajectory for support to AMISOM will be United Nations assessed contribution. This has been the consistent position of the Peace and Security Council and the AU Commission. António Guterres, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, also reflected this position in recent statements: if political will by the United Nations Security Council does not allow for the authorization of United Nations assessed contributions for AMISOM, and there is no alternative source of predictable and sustainable funding, the Peace and Security Council may wish to consider the future of AMISOM, including the possibility of an accelerated withdrawal from the mission. Indeed, this will not be in the interests of the people and Government of Somalia, but we also need to consider the safety, security and morale of our personnel that are working in arduous conditions. In a similar vein, I am looking forward to the security conference on Somalia, scheduled for October 2017 in Addis Ababa, as an important platform to mobilize resources for Somalia security institutions and for AMISOM.

28. Finally, coordination of support to the Somalia security sector is imperative. The AU-United Nations joint review team expressed concern on the lack of coordination by some bilateral partners in the support provided to the security sector. Without effective coordination of support to the security sector, there will be slow or, in fact, negative progress in enhancing the security sector, which will have implications for the envisaged AMISOM transition plan. To address this concern, it is important for the Peace and Security Council to endorse the recommendation on the joint verification of capabilities of the Somali National Security Forces, with a view to identifying existing gaps and ways to address them in order to allow for more effective joint operations between AMISOM and the Security Forces. In addition, during the visit of the President of Somalia, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed Farmajo, to Addis Ababa in May 2017, we agreed to establish the Somalia-African Union task force as a credible coordination mechanism for the provision of international support to the Somalia security sector. This task force had its inaugural meeting in Nairobi on 17 May 2017, and the Commission is working on a terms of reference for this coordination mechanism.

# Annex III

## Report on the 10-year lessons learned review conference on AMISOM

**Nairobi, 9 and 10 March 2017**

**Summary of recommendations**

In the light of the approaching tenth anniversary of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) on 6 September 2016, authorized the AU Commission to begin the process of producing "a comprehensive lessons learned exercise, which will identify progress made, challenges encountered and more importantly recommend options on the way forward in the future of AMISOM, including the Mission Exit Strategy." This request was re-iterated during the 649th meeting of the AU PSC on Somalia, on 23 January 2017, where PSC members requested the finalization of the 10-year lessons learned study.

It is against this background that AMISOM and the Peace Support Operations Division convened a lessons learned workshop on AMISOM, from 9 to 10 March 2017, in Nairobi, Kenya. The summary of recommendations that emanated from this workshop is presented below across four levels namely: political, strategic, and operational and exit strategy in accordance with the AU methodology on lessons learned studies in peace support operations.

**Political level**

i. Political consultations between the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council have remained at an informal level and it is proposed that the two Councils need to move a step further and undertake concerted, systematic joint analysis to allow for greater harmonization of mandates for AMISOM between the UNSC and AU PSC.

ii. Develop a consensus on what roles the AU should play beyond peace enforcement with regard to the policing and civilian components of international engagement in Somalia.

iii. The AU should improve its strategy on how to transition AMISOM from a more military-led intervention focused on degrading Al-Shabaab to a robust multidimensional stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction and development mechanism.

iv. There is a need to develop Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to ensure that UNSOS is involved and effectively delivers in the implementation of AMISOM Concept of Operations (CONOPS) from the onset.

v. AMISOM and its partners must strengthen their focus on empowering the Somali National Security Forces and developing effective institutions of governance to sustain results by delivering a "peace dividend" to populations in areas recovered from Al-Shabaab.

vi. AMISOM must develop more effective strategic communications in order to disseminate its narrative and key messages to the right audiences, particularly to Somalis.

vii. Ensure greater coordination and cooperation, including the possibility of co-location between UNSOM and, the civilian component of AMISOM.

**Strategic level**

viii. There is an urgent need to align mandated tasks and available resources, including strengthening the role of the AU Commission to better manage peace support operations by improving ongoing efforts to enhance human resources, administrative and financial procedures.

ix. There remains a need to strengthen information-sharing and knowledge management between the AU Commission and AMISOM, including the capabilities to capture and disseminate lessons learned.

x. There remains a need to continually adapt AU policies and guidelines to fit the challenges posed by the realities on the ground in Somalia.

**Operational level**

xi. AMISOM should deploy civilian capacity at the Federal Member State level, and act as liaisons on stabilization through daily interaction with local/regional administrations and communities and linkage with development actors in Mogadishu, as well as providing necessary guidance to sectors on QIPs.

xii. To improve current command and control structures for AMISOM's military component, TCCs should give space to the Force Commander to control his troops, including by strengthening communications.

xiii. AMISOM's capabilities should be aligned with the nature of its operations, including by placing greater emphasis on the key elements of counterinsurgency doctrine to enable enhanced mobility, accurate and timely intelligence-gathering, and adequate logistical support.

xiv. AMISOM should produce more data on the extent to which the Mission, its partners, and the Somali National Security Forces have degraded Al-Shabaab capabilities.

xv. AMISOM should receive an additional capability surge of troops, enablers and intelligence enhancement in order to successfully execute renewed offensive operations along the Juba valley.

xvi. AMISOM needs to strengthen the integration between its military, police and civilian components in order to deliver the Mission's objectives.

xvii. AMISOM should strengthen its counter-IED capabilities.

**Exit strategy**

xviii. AMISOM should pursue a condition-based exit strategy anchored on an inclusive politically agreed set of Somali security institutions and tied to the minimum capacity of the Somali national security forces to take over, as well as more broadly promoting a strong sense of Somali leadership and ownership for the political, security, and economic direction of Somalia.

xix. There needs to be more effective training and leadership development of the Somali national security forces, including through better coordination of capacity building support amongst relevant partners.

xx. AMISOM and its partners should recalibrate the strategy for developing an effective set of Somali National Security Forces and sketch an appropriate roadmap. In the short-term, there should be increased co-location of the SNA and AMISOM and more joint operations and mentoring, with the SNA increasingly being given leading roles.

xxi. AMISOM continued presence in Somalia will be significantly influenced by the availability of predictable and sustainable resources of the Mission.

**Introduction**

1. In the light of the approaching tenth anniversary of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) on 6 September 2016, authorized the AU Commission to begin the process of producing "a comprehensive lessons learned exercise, which will identify progress made, challenges encountered and more importantly recommend options on the way forward in the future of AMISOM, including the Mission Exit Strategy." This request was reemphasized during the 649th meeting of the AU PSC on Somalia, on 23 January 2017, where Council members requested the finalization of the 10-year lessons learned study.

2. As part of that process, the AU Commission organized a lessons learned conference in Nairobi, Kenya, on 9 to 10 March 2017, to identify AMISOM's principal successes, challenges and the way forward. Drawing on the methodology recently developed for evaluating lessons from AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs), the conference proceeded to identify lessons from AMISOM's experiences pertaining to:

i. The political level of decision-making: to determine whether AMISOM's mandates and authorized resources are fit for purpose;

ii. The strategic management of AMISOM: to determine how far the AU Commission provides appropriate strategic guidance to AMISOM's decision-making organs;

iii. The operational level: to determine the main challenges of command and control facing AMISOM's leadership as well as how effectively the Mission's military, police and civilian components are integrated; and

iv. AMISOM's exit strategy: to determine how the Mission might transform to facilitate a successful takeover by Somali security services.

3. The conference discussions drew from and developed some of the conclusions developed in a separate background paper, which identified lessons from AMISOM's ten years. These were organized according to the following thematic areas of focus on AMISOM:

a. Evolution of mandate.

b. Major characteristics of its "model."

c. Operational successes and challenges.

d. Multidimensional components as an integrated mission.

e. Mission support regime.

f. Experiences of building the Somali security forces.

g. Relationships with its partners.

h. Exit strategy.

4. The background paper identified both challenges and opportunities, highlighting what has worked for AMISOM thus far as well as what could have worked better in the Mission. Participants emphasized that any assessment of AMISOM's achievements and challenges should start from the recognition that Somalia is an extremely complex operating environment for a peace operation. This is due to a variety of factors including the limited effectiveness of state institutions,

the large number of armed groups {hostile and non-hostile) and their tendency to shift alliances, the involvement of regional and other external actors, and the fact that AMISOM was required to undertake a complex multifaceted mandate, including urban warfare, stabilization and counterinsurgency.

5. There was broad agreement that AMISOM had achieved its principal strategic goals, notably protecting the successive Somali authorities (the Transitional Federal Government and Federal Government of Somalia) and later the Interim Regional Administrations, degrading Al-Shabaab, and securing two election processes that produced federal governments in 2012 and 2016/17. Much of the credit for these accomplishments was due to the perseverance and innovation of AMISOM personnel at the strategic, operational and tactical levels who repeatedly overcame unforeseen challenges.

6. The lessons as identified by participants at the conference are structured along four key areas: Political; Strategic; Operational; and Exit Strategy.

**Political level**

7. Strengthening the mandating process and working level engagement has gone a long way in ensuring alignments between the United Nations Security Council and the AU PSC. Improvements in the harmonization process began in 2011, including the role of the regular consultations between the memberships of the two councils; principal-level discussions (including the Joint Task Force) and the authorization of joint planning and management initiatives (including joint benchmarking and assessment teams as well as working groups).

8. Nevertheless, consultations between the two councils have remained at an informal level and there was a suggestion that the two councils might move a step further and undertake concerted, systematic joint analysis to allow for greater coherence between individual decisions. It was also observed that despite the AU's initial vision for AMISOM, there was no political agreement on transitioning AMISOM into a UN peacekeeping operation despite the UN Security Council also envisioning AMISOM as an interim stabilization measure. This issue is still a source of confusion in the relations between UNSOM and AMISOM relations.

9. The outstanding questions relate to more fundamental issues of subsidiarity and complementarity; especially the discussion of what roles the AU should play beyond peace enforcement with regard to the policing and civilian components of international engagement in Somalia. It was noted in this context that the current administrative and financial procedures at the AU are inadequate to meet the needs of most of its peace support operations. Participants agreed on the need to harmonize the AMISOM's mandate since it comes from more than one source of authority. It was noted that conceptual gaps still exist between the UN and AU (including at secretariat levels) and that these need to be bridged and harmonized. Some of these gaps are related to interpretations of the UN Charter and the AU Constitutive Act on the principle of subsidiarity and comparative advantages related to conflict resolution issues. Others relate to the nature of the strategic partnership between the UN and AU, and relations between the AU and IGAD. Consequently, participants identified the need to strengthen the harmonization of mandates for AMISOM between the Security Council and AU PSC.

10. Participants agreed that AMISOM had remained too military heavy. This was understandable during AMISOM's early years when insecurity in Mogadishu prevented the deployment of the Mission's police and civilian components. Since late 2011, the Mission was too slow to adapt itself to the multidimensional character of its mandate and configuration. There were even cases where AMISOM representatives were excluded from governance mechanisms in 5omalia because it

was seen as a heavily military Mission. Consequently, it was noted that there was no question about the necessity for AMISOM's multidimensional composition.

11. Participants also noted that even though AMISOM is a multidimensional mission, there was limited guidance on the role, and integration, of the non-military components against Mission goals. It was recognized that the African Union has a comparative advantage in immediate stabilization and support to the political process were seen as salient. In this regard, it was recommended that AMISOM deploy civilian capacity at the state level, and act as liaisons on stabilization through daily interaction with local administration and communities and linkage with development actors in Mogadishu, as well as providing necessary guidance to sectors on QIPs.

12. One of the areas of repeated disconnect in the AMISOM "model" was the relationship between AMISOM and UNSOS. Specifically, a disconnect was identified between the timing of the UN budget approval process and the various iterations of the revised AMISOM CONOPS. There is a need for UNSOS to be involved in the CONORS planning process from the onset to ensure delivery on the requested support in a timely manner. It was suggested that relevant SOPs be developed as a way to formalize the necessary coordination.

13. Participants were in agreement that AMISOM and its partners have not been able to sufficiently empower Somalis so that they can take over from the AU Mission. The question was raised of why Somali National Security Forces have not developed sufficiently during AMISOM's ten years of operations? AMISOM and its partners must therefore strengthen their focus on empowering the Somali national security forces and developing effective institutions of governance to sustain results by delivering a "peace dividend" to populations in areas recovered from Al-Shabaab. This would also involve the need to secure the Main Supply Routes between AMISOM and SNA bases across south-central Somalia and thereby facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. This took on even greater urgency in light of the current famine and drought.

14. Participants agreed that it was imperative for AMISOM to develop more effective strategic communications. Somalis are constantly evaluating AMISOM and are not always coming to positive conclusions about the Mission's impact. This raised the question of why there might be a divergence between AMISOM's self-image as a broadly successful operation and local populations who do not necessarily appreciate the Mission's achievements in the same way. Participants agreed on the need for AMISOM to more effectively develop its narrative and key messages to tell its story to the right audiences, particularly to Somalis. Concern was expressed that despite having a broadly positive narrative to tell, AMISOM continued to lose the battle on social media. Participants emphasized that the solution lay not solely with improving the Mission's strategic communications instruments but with encouraging a comprehensive response that generated political buy-in and support from Somalia's political leaders, civic associations and ordinary citizens. In sum, a unified political response was needed to prevent radicalization and fight against extremist ideology propagated by Al-Shabaab. This would require capabilities and resources in support of the current AU-UN information Support Team. It would also require Somali scholars, intellectuals and politicians to come out in public and denounce Al-Shabaab and explain why its ideology is wrong, dangerous, and unacceptable.

15. In discussions on AMISOM's civilian component, it was observed that some clarification was needed on cooperation and division of labour between UNSOM and the civilian component of AMISOM. It was emphasized that the conceptual origin of AU PSOs is based on multidimensionality, comprising of civilian, police

and military components. There was a need to deepen the support provided by UNSOA/UNSOS to AMISOM civilian and police components, in order to improve effectiveness.

**Strategic level**

16. Participants agreed on the urgent need to align mandated tasks and available resources. This should include ensuring that the question of appropriate resources and capabilities is part of the initial deliberations about the Mission's mandate. However, participants also noted that there was a tendency for the UN Security Council to set ceilings for funding and allow financial imperatives to drive the discussion of force requirements rather than the other way around. There was also consensus that AMISOM had been consistently under-resourced in key areas throughout its entire ten years of operations. Not only were the authorized capabilities insufficient compared to the mandated tasks but the AU and its partners inadequately generated and deployed the authorized forces, leaving AMISOM lacking significant capabilities in the field. Notably, AMISOM forces were generated from only approximately 8% of the AU's 54 Member States, which is significantly lower than other AU PSOs such as the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) where Member States pledged more capacities for less complex multidimensional peace support operations. While it was acknowledged that the AU Commission had struggled to ensure effective force generation for AMISOM, it was also noted that the Mission's TCCs must also deliver forces as per the terms of their MoUs, including related to the clauses concerning sustainment capabilities and equipment. A suggestion was made that the PSC might want to ensure that relevant resources were available before mandating peace operations.

17. There was discussion as to how the principle of subsidiarity should influence the AU's strategic management of AMISOM. It was noted that there is a need for enhancing collaboration between the AU and IGAD in the political engagements on Somalia.

18. Consensus emerged on the need to strengthen the role of the AU Commission, which is the strategic headquarters for the Union's peace support operations in general. In addition, it was noted that once a PSO is authorized, there must be a Commission-wide approach to supporting it. There have been previous efforts to ensure coordination amongst various PSD divisions and other AUC departments, such as the now defunct Peace Support Operations Coordinating Committee (PSOCC), established and chaired by the Deputy Chairperson to meet on a monthly basis and bringing together representatives from PSOD, PSD Finance and other departmental representatives, Internal Audit, Human Resources to discuss matters relating to ongoing operations, share information and provide updates on issues related to operations and mission support. In the case of AMISOM, not only did the AU Commission lack a prepared force generation plan, it also did not adequately marshal all its component parts in support of the Mission. Areas identified for strengthened involvement by the AU Commission included Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development, State Building, Rule of Law and Security Institutions (Security Sector Reform; Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) and Political/Civil Affairs. Calls were also made for closer involvement of the Commission's Department of Political Affairs and the Defense and Security Division of PSD.

19. Participants noted that the strategic management of AMISOM was consistently hindered by limitations relating to human resources. Not only were there challenges related to force generation, bureaucratic systems to hire and retain appropriately qualified personnel were not aligned to the need for rapid deployment. Staff

retention and rotation also proved challenging, especially for personnel with specialized skills (e.g., intelligence and security sector reform). This, in turn, hindered mandate delivery and the establishment of a well-functioning working relationship with UN counterparts. Current administrative and financial procedures at the AU are inadequate to the needs of a peace enforcement mission, it was suggested that it would be imperative to find a way to better integrate the AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) with the Administration and Finance Department.

20. Participants also raised the need to strengthen AU-AMISOM information-sharing and knowledge management. Between 2007 and 2017, the AU PSC issued over forty communiques on the situation in Somalia, indicating its seriousness and AMISOM as one of its priorities. Yet although a decision was taken in 2011 for the PSC to visit AMISOM in Somalia no such visit was undertaken until October 2013. From the start of the Mission in 2007, daily strategic management of AMISOM was under an ad hoc arrangement, the Strategic Planning and Management Unit (SPMU), which combined personnel from the AU, UN, NATO and other partners. It was not until 2012 that the planning and management of AMISOM transitioned to the PSOD. In addition, a real time video-conferencing system between PSOD and AMISOM was not established until 2009/10. On the basis of better communication, participants also agreed on the need to strengthen documentation about AMISOM to ensure lessons learned are captured and disseminated. As the only AU mission that has tasted more than two years, AMISOM can potentially generate a rich body of lessons learned that has the potential to influence future AU PSO doctrine.

21. A related point was raised about the continued disconnect between the nature of AU peace operations and the available policies and guidelines. Specifically, the AU has largely relied on UN guidelines crafted for a peacekeeping context. Yet there is a fundamental mismatch between UN processes and systems designed for peacekeeping and the tasks at hand for AMISOM, which involve counterinsurgency, stabilization and war-fighting. There is therefore a need to adapt AU policies and guidelines to fit the challenges posed by the realities on the ground in Somalia, which call for enforcement of peace.

**Operational level**

22. Participants noted that although AMISOM had achieved a variety of operational successes over the last decade, some of those gains remained fragile and could be reversed, especially if Somalia governance structures could not deliver safety, services and justice to local populations in the areas recovered from Al-Shabaab.

23. It was noted that effective operations require an effective command and control structure. Participants reiterated that AMISOM's command and control structures had not always performed effectively and could be improved. In many instances, the command of AMISOM troops was exercised not by the Force Commander but from the national capitals of the TCCs. In contrast, participants observed that command and control structures for AMISOM's police component had not suffered similar problems. To improve current command and control structures for the Mission's military component, it was suggested that ICC Governments should empower the Mission's senior leadership including the Force Commander to control his troops. Furthermore, communications should be strengthened; both by ensuring better communication between the AU, AMISOM and TCCs, as well as between the Mission Force Headquarters and Sector Commands. While the establishment of the intelligence (i2 cell) had improved the situation, more could be done in this area.

24. Another point of consensus was the need for available capabilities to be aligned with the nature of AMISOM's operations. This meant placing greater emphasis on the key elements of counterinsurgency doctrine, which require mobility, accurate and timely intelligence-gathering and adequate logistical support. AMISOM's operations must therefore be politically coherent, information-led, and recognize that insurgencies like Al-Shabaab are best beaten by local forces and governments rather than foreigners. in practice, however, AMISOM had become bogged down and vulnerable with its forces stretched across a very large area of operations. AMISOM had also previously focused too much effort on capturing territory rather than degrading Al-Shabaab's core combat capabilities. AMISOM's forces were over-stretched as a result and struggled to bring with them local Somali troops, police and administrators. When implementing its current mandate to degrade Al-Shabaab, participants noted that AMISOM was not optimally configured to deal with Al-Shabaab's more asymmetric tactics and it would be useful to produce more data on the extent to which AMISOM and the Somali national security forces had degraded its capabilities.

25. With regard to logistics, participants noted the challenge that AMISOM does not control its logistics, which come from the United Nations and other forms of partner support. This placed a premium on ensuring a good working relationship between the AU and UNSOS. It was also noted that UNSOS was regularly asked to engage in innovative activities, including fixing partner-donated vehicles to the AMISOM TCCs that did not come with their own maintenance packages.

26. Participants also called for AMISOM to receive an additional troop surge in order to successfully execute renewed offensive operations along the Juba valley. In addition, effective offensive operations would also require AMISOM to emphasize intelligence enhancement and generate more enablers to help in the fight.

27. There was a strong consensus that AMISOM needs to strengthen the integration between its military, police and civilian components in order to deliver the Mission's political objectives. It was noted that AMISOM's police component had achieved a number of successes but remained under-resourced. One innovation had been the decision to split some of AMISOM's Formed Police Units to operate at platoon level in order to support the most recent election process in Kismayo and Baidoa. Part of operating as a more multidimensional operation should entail developing an active CIMIC element. AMISOM's limited CIMIC operations were noted as having played a critical role in winning hearts and minds amongst the local population. Yet, AMISOM was not well configured to undertake more intense levels of CIMIC activity.

28. With regard to AMISOM's civilian component, it was agreed that its role should be integrated and complementary to the military effort by leveraging support from all the key stakeholders and partners to generate the political and governance actions necessary to make the overall stabilization strategy a success. Put simply, stability cannot be sustained if a political settlement is not forthcoming and if the governance vacuum in recovered areas is not filled. There could also have been clearer leadership in the mission. It was observed that AMISOM's senior civilian leadership was largely absent from Somalia during the first five years of the Mission. There was also little done to track and assess the contribution of the civilian component against mission goals and better integrate it into AMISOM's planning processes. The result was that for too long the civilian dimension was treated as a low priority. Consequently, it was noted that AMISOM still lacked staff in a number of key positions, including in the Joint Support Operations Centre and mission support positions more generally, it was suggested that there should be a significant increase In the capacity of AMISOM's political and civil affairs staff,

including by hiring more Somali nationals especially to work at the regional and local levels.

29. A consensus of opinion emerged that AMISOM needed to strengthen its counter-IED capabilities and deploy additional force multipliers, especially the attack helicopters that had been authorized by the UN Security Council in 2012. Although AMISOM had received in December 2016 three Kenyan helicopters, these were utility aircraft and not the type of gunships required to destroy Al-Shabaab's combat assets. Given the long-standing problems of generating these assets, it was suggested that the AU should look beyond the AMISOM TCCs to other African countries and perhaps beyond the continent.

30. Participants emphasized that the nature of current AMISOM operations should be reflected in the pre-deployment training available to the peacekeepers. Having previously required significant training in techniques of urban warfare, AMISOM operations now emphasized aspects of counterinsurgency, stabilization and countering IED networks.

**Exit strategy**

31. AMISOM's exit strategy is currently predicated on three interrelated factors: the TCCs have expressed an interest in drawing down the Mission starting in October 2018; the growing likelihood of dwindling resources from AMISOM's partners; and the minimal prospect of a UN peacekeeping operation taking over.

32. In light of these factors, participants agreed on the need for a condition-based exit strategy for AMISOM, anchored on a politically agreed set of Somali security institutions and tied to the capacity of the Somali national security forces to take over. It was noted that the AU and international partners should guard against building only a strong SNA, in case this increased the risks of future coups, and instead develop the full range of security services. There was also some criticism of the envisioned timeline for AMISOM's drawdown, in part because the timing is unfortunate given the political vision of "one-person-one-vote" elections in Somalia by 2020. It was suggested that it might be more constructive to talk about AMISOM's "transformation" into a smaller, leaner, more effective mobile counter-terrorism force rather than just its exit.

33. Participants agreed on the need to ensure more effective training of the Somali national security forces. This includes ensuring that efforts are aligned with identified needs including equipping and provision of stipends and services; there is better coordination and harmonization between the multiple training initiatives currently underway, including those involving private sector firms; and that an effective tracking mechanism is developed to efficiently utilize resources. It was also observed that although numerous trainings had been conducted of the Somali national security forces, in a number of cases, these had mainly been done for individuals and few specific units. In addition, leadership development remained an important blind spot. New initiatives were required to identify and cultivate the future leaders of the Somali national security forces, including commanders of the subsequent companies, battalions, and brigades in the SNA.

34. Concerns were raised that the SNA will not have developed the sufficient capacity within the timelines currently envisaged for AMISOM's withdrawal. It was noted, for instance, that with the exception of the "Danaab" battalion, not a single SNA unit was fully trained, equipped, and at full capacity to deploy, conduct operations and sustain themselves in the field, in part, this was linked to the problems in current efforts to train the SNA. But it was also noted that the inability to regularly pay Somali security forces had partly encouraged defections and undermined morale.

35. There was consequently broad recognition that the building of an effective and legitimate SNA is a long-term endeavour. Considerable emphasis was also placed on the need to recognize that security sector reform and empowering the Somali national security forces was ultimately a political issue. Without the necessary political will and agreed vision between the FGS and Somalia's regional states, establishing an inclusive, legitimate and professional set of forces would prove elusive. Participants agreed on the need to recalibrate the strategy for developing an effective set of Somali national security forces and sketch an appropriate roadmap.

36. There was also a call for the AU and its partners to develop shorter-term solutions that would allow AMISOM to commence drawdown and reconfiguration in line with its exit strategy. It was suggested that there should be increased co-location and more joint operations with AMISOM, with the SNA increasingly being given leading roles. It was noted that a follow-up conference specifically on this topic would be useful and that the details of a "security pact" between the Somali authorities and international partners would be a key theme of discussions at the London Conference. At the London conference on Somalia, held on 11 May 2017, the Government of Somalia, the AU and the other partners agreed on a New Partnership for Somalia and a security pact. The AU and the partners agreed on a mechanism for implementing the partnership, with a view to optimizing the impact of joint efforts to support the Somali national security forces.

## Annex IV

### A. Table of the human rights due diligence policy, migratory measures and mechanisms of the African Union Mission in Somalia, and recommendations for their strengthening

| *Measures and mechanisms* | *Status and challenges* | *Recommendations and responsibilities* |
|---|---|---|
| *Prevention* | | |
| **Selection and screening** | **African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops and police**<br>-Selection of troops/police carried out by troop- and police-contributing countries prior to the pre-deployment trainings<br>-Ongoing AU/United Nations cooperation to develop background checks/screening mechanisms<br>**Challenges**<br>-Limited or no United Nations/AU visibility on background checks mechanisms used by troop- and police-contributing countries | -Integrate background checks criteria (grade, history of deployment) in predeployment visits or troop- and police-contributing countries training centres (AMISOM, AU, troop- and police-contributing countries with United Nations support)<br>-Establish a process by which the AU/AMISOM provide information to the United Nations about future deployment/appointment/rotation and request support for purpose of background checks (AU and United Nations Headquarters) |
| | **Child soldiers**<br>-Force Commander's directive on protection of children in armed conflict adopted in 2014<br>-General order 1 of 2011 on prohibited practices for Somali National Armed Forces personnel in all areas of Somalia<br>**Challenges**<br>-Continued concerns about use of children or violations of children rights during joint operations with Somali National Army or local troops | -Strengthen the implementation of FC directive and ensure that Somali National Armed Forces has screened its combat units to identify/separate children prior to joint operations (AMISOM with United Nations support)<br>-Provide information on dissemination, level of implementation and compliance with the directive of the Force Commander and the Somalia's action plans to end the recruitment and use and the killing and maiming of children by Somali National Armed Forces and security forces (AMISOM) |

| *Measures and mechanisms* | *Status and challenges* | *Recommendations and responsibilities* |
|---|---|---|
| **Training** | **Predeployment training** | -Establish an oversight mechanism, including through predeployment visits, to monitor the delivery and impact of training, ensure AU consultation on training curricula and share reports on training status with the United Nations (AMISOM/AU/United Nations) |
| | -**Predeployment training** for commanding officers and key appointment holders delivered with the involvement of the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and AMISOM | -Conduct a joint assessment on the effectiveness of predeployment training, including in terms of behaviour change, in all sectors (United Nations/AMISOM) |
| | -Trainees sign a document acknowledging they have been trained and committing to respect/comply with international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law | -Include elements of accountability process (boards of inquiry), Civilian Casualty Tracking Analysis and Response Cell and judgmental training in predeployment training curricula (AU with United Nations support) |
| | **Challenges** | -Establish a training database for systematic registration of participants to facilitate tracking of individual deployments, training information and compliance with international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law (AMISOM/United Nations) |
| | -Absence of system to cross-reference names of trained personnel via-a-vis deployed personnel | |
| | -Challenges in assessing effectiveness of training | |
| | **In-mission training** | -Strengthen coordination between actors delivering in-mission training to/for AMISOM, including by encouraging their participation in the training working group of the Defense Steering Group, and advocate for inclusion of international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law in all training (AMISOM with United Nations support) |
| | -In-mission refresher training in international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law, including on child protection, delivered by AMISOM and other actors | -Strengthen in-mission training, including the provision of facilities for training at sector level (United Nations) |
| | **Challenges** | -Ensure that international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law training-of-trainers sessions are established within AMISOM (AMISOM) |
| | -Absence of visibility or coordination of actors providing in-mission training | |
| **Rules, policies and planning** | **Rules of engagement (general)** | -Formally endorse rules of engagement (AU) |
| | -The 2014 AMISOM rules of engagement (revised and unsigned) are reported to be applicable | -Create "pocket cards" on rules of engagement, including specific provisions on the use of helicopters and translate the existing version of the soldier's cards in languages of all troop- and police-contributing countries (AMISOM/United Nations) |
| | -Ongoing translation of the rules of engagement in the languages of the troop-and police-contributing countries | |

| *Measures and mechanisms* | *Status and challenges* | *Recommendations and responsibilities* |
|---|---|---|
| | | -Ensure full awareness of and compliance with rules of engagement by AMISOM troops and police (AMISOM) |
| | **Challenges**<br>-Rules of engagement not formally adopted by AU<br>-Different background and military doctrines among troop- and police-contributing countries may impact on full awareness of and compliance with the rules of engagement | |
| | **Rules of engagement and policies for air assets**<br>-Letter of assist signed with the United Nations | -Review rules of engagement to include elements on targeting, measures mitigating risk of civilian casualties and damage to civilian property (AMISOM/AU) |
| | **Challenges**<br>-Lack of AMISOM specific policies on the operational use and tasking of the air assets | -Establish specific provisions on the operational use and tasking of AMISOM helicopters, in line with the letter of assist and international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law(AMISOM with United Nations support) |
| | **Detention**<br>-Standard operating procedures on detention adopted<br>-Somali security forces standard operating procedures for the reception and handover of children separated from armed groups in Somalia | -Update the AMISOM/United Nations joint working group on human rights due diligence policy regarding the implementation of the standard operating procedures, including challenges and follow up actions (AMISOM) |
| | **Challenges**<br>-Challenges in coordination and handover of detained persons due to lack of facilities/resources and fear of violations by the receiving Somali security forces | -Ensure that there is a reporting process with Civilian Casualty Tracking Analysis and Response Cell/International Committee of the Red Cross as to who is detained and who is being handed over (AMISOM) |
| | | -Consider participating in a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration forum with the Federal Government of Somalia and other partners (AMISOM) |
| | | -Explore the establishment of a framework for support to and safe handling of persons temporarily detained by AMSIOM, including communication of information on children handed over to the Federal Government of Somalia counterparts (AMISOM/United Nations) |

| *Measures and mechanisms* | *Status and challenges* | *Recommendations and responsibilities* |
|---|---|---|
| | **Indirect fire policy**<br>-Policy elaborated in 2011 | -Update the AMISOM/ United Nations joint working group on human rights due diligence policy on the implementation of the policy, including any challenges and follow-up to allegations received (AMISOM) |
| | **Challenges**<br>-Delays of feedback on investigations on allegations of civilian casualties as a result of possible indirect fire partly due to capacity challenges in AMISOM | |
| **Prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse** | -AMISOM guidelines for the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse developed<br>-Campaigns carried out within Mogadishu International Airport, Mogadishu and AMISOM sectors<br>-Training on the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse and public outreach campaigns<br>-Toll-free hotline for confidential complaints established | -Update the AMISOM/United Nations joint working group on human rights due diligence policy regarding statistics on the number of sexual exploitation and abuse cases received and handled, including trends and patterns (AMISOM)<br>-Include information on cases of sexual exploitation and abuse in quarterly report to the Security Council on the implementation of AMISOM mandate (AU)<br>-Develop measures for the protection of victims and witnesses and a protocol on confidentiality of information (AMISOM with United Nations support) |
| | **Challenges**<br>-Limited information on findings and complaints handling through the toll-free line<br>-Actions and challenges on victims/witness protection not sufficiently shared. | -Finalize the whistle blower policy, which addresses the issue of victims/witness protection, and the conduct and discipline policy (AU)<br>-Expand the scope of complaints for the hotline number to include cases not involving sexual exploitation or abuse |

| *Measures and mechanisms* | *Status and challenges* | *Recommendations and responsibilities* |
|---|---|---|
| *Monitoring and reporting* | | |
| **Civilian Casualty Tracking Analysis and Response Cell** | -Civilian Casualty Tracking Analysis and Response Cell established and staffed by two active technical staff and additional military support staff<br><br>-Standard operating procedures on ex gratia payment cleared at the technical level<br><br>**Challenges**<br><br>-Insufficient staffing hampers capability to follow up on all allegations, verify civilian casualties in a timely manner, maintain contact with victims/witnesses and produce updated trends and patterns<br><br>-Information not sufficiently shared with relevant actors including the United Nations<br><br>-Limited access for the public and no base in the regions<br><br>-Absence of dedicated staff to receive and handle complaints<br><br>-Absence of measures to ensure victims and witness protection | -Agree on information sharing arrangements between the United Nations and the Response Cell (AMISOM/United Nations)<br><br>-Resolve funding issue for the implementation of the standard operating procedures on ex gratia/amends (AMISOM/United Nations)<br><br>-Disseminate information, including through the media, on the Response Cell, how the population can access its services and improve collaboration with partners (AMISOM)<br><br>-Improve social media monitoring when air assets are being used to identify potential incidents (AMISOM)<br><br>-Include sexual exploitation and abuse incidents in the Response Cell processes and database, with consideration for confidentiality aspects (AMISOM)<br><br>-Promote cooperation and establish accountability mechanism for reporting by sectors (AMISOM)<br><br>-Improve links between existing complaints handling mechanisms, including Provost Marshall, Civilian Casualty Tracking Analysis and Response Cell, Board of Inquiry and CEEBLA crisis hotline (AMISOM with United Nations support)<br><br>-Create a mechanism to protect victims and witnesses (AMISOM)<br><br>-Ensure timely review, follow-up and feedback to the United Nations on complaints received or communicated to AMISOM (AMISOM)<br><br>-Improve analytical function of the Civilian Casualty Tracking Analysis and Response Cell (AMISOM with United Nations support)<br><br>-Resolve staffing issues |

| *Measures and mechanisms* | *Status and challenges* | *Recommendations and responsibilities* |
|---|---|---|
| **Reporting on air operations** | -Letter of assist provides for incident and monthly reports relating to air operations | -Submit (air crews) incident reports involving deaths or injuries to AMISOM within 24 hours and ensure subsequent timely sharing with the United Nations (AMISOM) |
| | **Challenges** | -Share monthly report with the United Nations on incidents arising from air operation, in particular the number of people affected, including their gender, the nature of harm, and the circumstances of the incidents (AMISOM) |
| | -Lack of Information sharing hinders the verification of allegations, which in turn hampers the attribution of responsibilities | |
| | -Blurring of lines/identities between AMISOM and troops present as bilateral foreign forces, hampers the monitoring and attribution of responsibilities for civilian casualties or destruction of civilian objects | |
| **AMISOM/United Nations human rights due diligence policy joint working group** | -Review of status of implementation of human rights due diligence policy mitigation measures is done on an ad hoc basis in the framework of the joint working group on human rights due diligence policy | -Ensure the quarterly meetings of the joint working group (AMISOM and United Nations) |
| | -Review of allegations of violations is a standing agenda item of the joint working group on human rights due diligence policy | -Add the review of implementation of mitigation measures as a standing agenda item of the joint working group (AMISOM) |
| | **Challenges** | -Enforce weekly meetings of UNSOM, UNSOS and AMISOM technical teams (AMISOM and United Nations) |
| | -Review and follow up of implementation of mitigation measures not systematic | -Share with the United Nations the command structure and locations of AMISOM troops in the sectors or provide updates whenever there are any changes (AMISOM) |
| | -Lack of information on command and control presents a challenge when verifying allegations and attributing responsibility | |
| *Response* | | |
| **BOIs** | -Board of Inquiry standard operating procedures under review to include international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law and sexual exploitation and abuse issues | -Expedite the review of Board of Inquiry procedures and standard operating procedures and integrate gender/child protection dimension, including through the organization of a technical workshop (AMISOM/United Nations) |

| *Measures and mechanisms* | *Status and challenges* | *Recommendations and responsibilities* |
|---|---|---|
| | **Challenges**<br><br>-Need for streamlined Board of Inquiry policies and procedures and timely feedback on allegations transmitted by the United Nations to AMISOM<br><br>-Need for information on temporary measures taken by AMISOM (if any) and recommendations transmitted to the AU and troop- and police-contributing countries<br><br>-Need for more and timely information-sharing on the findings of the Board of Inquiry with alleged victims/communities<br><br>-Need for a standing special investigative capacity to support the Board of Inquiry process | -Consider the deployment of five AU troop-contributing countries (not AMISOM troop- and police-contributing countries) dedicated AU staff with specific investigative skills to boost AMISOM standing investigation capacity (AU)<br><br>-Ensure timely formal feedback on allegations transmitted by the United Nations to AMISOM (including those that did not require a board of inquiry) as per the United Nations/ AMISOM established procedure, including actions taken by AMISOM to implement the recommendations (AMISOM).<br><br>-Share with the United Nations Board of Inquiry recommendations transmitted to the AU for troop- and police-contributing countries follow-up (AMISOM)<br><br>-Improve the conduct of investigations, including through a review of the methodology used (AMISOM with United Nations support)<br><br>-Strengthen Board of Inquiry information management system as part of the measures to strengthen its effectiveness (United Nations Headquarters)<br><br>-Continue the advocacy with troop- and police-contributing countries on the possibility of court martial *in loco* (AU and United Nations Headquarters)<br><br>-Sharing of information when violations are committed by non-AMISOM troop-contributing countries |

## B. African Union Mission in Somalia and United Nations Support Office in Somalia: measures to strengthen accountability and efficiency (June 2017)

| *Serial* *(a)* | *Activity* *(b)* | *Issue* *(c)* | *Recommendation (2017 timeline)* *(d)* | *Lead responsibility* *(e)* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | Reporting | • Enhance the Joint Support Operations Centre by reviewing its functions and staff output<br>• All "pull" support requests to be channelled through a mechanism that allows for effective command, control and accountability | • Need to have a "pull" support requests tracking and reporting cell/unit within the Joint Support Operations Centre (1 Aug.) | Joint Support Operations Centre |
| 2. | Co-location and information-sharing | • The United Nations Support Office (UNSOS), troop-contributing countries and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) are duplicating some efforts, exacerbated by insufficient coordination meetings<br>• Bilateral action between troop-contributing countries and UNSOS that bypasses AMISOM Force headquarters is symptomatic of multiple steps in communication through Force headquarters between troop-contributing countries sector clients and UNSOS service delivery, and involving the non-alignment of troop-contributing countries with Security Council resolutions 2245 (2015) and 2297 (2016), AMISOM concept of operations and United Nations policies, which undermines the sustainable delivery of logistical support | • Co-location of troop contributing countries and AMISOM mission support elements in the Joint Support Operations Centre, under medical, engineering, geospatial, information technology and telecommunications, movement control and aviation components (1 Aug.)<br>• Pair up positions within AMISOM and troop-contributing countries to improve trust, communications and hand-over of duties when AMISOM military staff officers reach their end of assignment (1 July) | Joint Support Operations Centre and troop-contributing countries |
| 3. | Joint planning | • There is a need for an improved AMISOM and troop-contributing countries integrated approach in order to determine priorities for mandated areas of support<br>• Need to enhance joint planning between AMISOM, troop-contributing countries and UNSOS. | • Joint planning to be enhanced by embedding AMISOM and troop-contributing countries logistics, medical, engineering and communication branches within a Logistics Planning Unit (1 Aug.)<br>• Weekly mission support meetings to include troop-contributing countries and UNSOS counterparts (1 June) | Joint Support Operations Centre and troop-contributing countries |

| *Serial* *(a)* | *Activity* *(b)* | *Issue* *(c)* | *Recommendation (2017 timeline)* *(d)* | *Lead responsibility* *(e)* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | • Need for improved communications on all levels | • Creation of a joint mission support and the troop-contributing countries committee (1 July) | |
| 4. | Civilian staffing for mission support component | • Need to address vacant AMISOM civilian positions; recruitment of international and national civilians is ongoing.<br>• Deployment of civilian staff to all sectors will require enhanced effort. | • Review the structure, civilian staffing and terms of references of mission support personnel to enable targeted recruitment planning (1 Aug.) | AMISOM Chief of Administrative Services |
| 5. | Maintenance of non-contingent-owned equipment | • Need to improve the serviceability status of all partner-owned equipment and non-contingent-owned equipment in accordance with Security Council resolution 2245 (2015). | • Deliver training course on the equipment support process — conducted by AMISOM mission support for troop-contributing countries contingent-owned equipment officers (1 Aug.)<br>• Donors, troop-contributing countries, AMISOM and UNSOS to improve and share data on the serviceability, location and repair of partner-owned equipment, including equipment beyond economical repair, for UNSOS de-recognition as partner-owned equipment and disposal by donors and troop-contributing countries | AMISOM mission support for serviceability status; UNSOS for items beyond economical repair; troop-contributing countries for disposal |
| 6. | Fuel consumption | • Large percentage of contingent-owned equipment and partner-owned equipment do not have odometers or hour meters, which is required by the Fuel Unit to monitor consumption<br>• There is restricted UNSOS access to remote AMISOM locations | • United Nations electronic fuel management system to be implemented (31 Dec.)<br>• UNSOS and AMISOM to undertake joint review of consumption patterns to establish baseline data (1 July)<br>• Implement of joint troop-contributing countries and AMISOM fuel consumption accountability mechanism based on physical utilization for the purposes intended by the Security Council (1 June)<br>• UNSOS to implement fuel as a "push" commodity. (1 June) | UNSOS for sustainable delivery of fuel. Joint Support Operations Centre for accountability for fuel consumption |

| *Serial* *(a)* | *Activity* *(b)* | *Issue* *(c)* | *Recommendation (2017 timeline)* *(d)* | *Lead responsibility* *(e)* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7. | Field defence stores | • United Nations-provided HESCO defensive barriers and sandbags are being sold in local markets — indicates lack of commodities control<br>• Limited number of commercial vendors | • Troop-contributing countries and AMISOM to improve tracking of field defence stores issued to troop-contributing countries<br>• Establish photographic catalogue of all sites and defence stores and conduct joint site inspections (1 Aug.)<br>• Redesign forward operating bases to reduce dependence on defensive barriers and train military and police in the correct use of defence stores. (1 June) | Troop-contributing countries and AMISOM engineering component. Redesign and training by UNSOS |
| 8. | Transport modalities | • Heavy reliance on air transport to deliver logistics in some sectors<br>• Limited funds do not allow for sustained air transport support for logistics delivery<br>• A formalized agreement is needed on the use of main supply routes, which aligns with the realities of the UNSOS approved budget and the requirements of United Nations policies | • Develop plans for sustained use of road transport.<br>• Provide budget for exceptional implementation of air supply as per the approved UNSOS budget<br>• Force headquarters and troop-contributing countries to provide accurate and complete monthly convoy reports and reach agreement on main supply routes plan (1 Aug.) | UNSOS for exceptional air supply budget and Force headquarters for plans and troop-contributing countries agreement |
| 9. | Troop strength reporting | • AMISOM headquarters (J1) provides personnel report based on the troop ceiling instead of actual personnel deployed<br>• This reporting has impact on rations planning and other support | • UNSOS to implement rations as a "push" commodity and use standard vacancy rates based on previous deployments<br>• Implement joint troop-contributing countries and AMISOM rations consumption accountability and credible reporting system based on physical utilization for the purposes intended by the Security Council (1 Aug.) | UNSOS for sustainable delivery of rations. Force headquarters, troop-contributing countries and personal consumption quotas for accountability for food consumption |

| *Serial* *(a)* | *Activity* *(b)* | *Issue* *(c)* | *Recommendation (2017 timeline)* *(d)* | *Lead responsibility* *(e)* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10. | Tracking of United Nations-owned equipment issued to AMISOM | • 4.5 per cent of United Nations-owned equipment has not been accounted for since 2013/14<br>• 13 per cent of United Nations owned-equipment is pending property verification | • UNSOS to review and investigate discrepancies with AMISOM issued United Nations owned-equipment, to write off eligible equipment and to reconcile issue vouchers<br>• Any future United Nations-owned equipment issued to AMISOM to be approved first by AMISOM mission support, second by the Joint Support Operations Centre and finally by the respective UNSOS commodity managers<br>• AMISOM mission support to approve all requests from individual police officers and staff officers and from AMISOM civilian personnel (1 Aug.) | UNSOS and AMISOM |